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How “postmodern” is “postmodernism”? 
This article sets out to question the claim that “postmodernism” is 
merely a development of the second half of the 20th century. What is 
unique about contemporary postmodernism is the way in which it has 
combined intellectual developments that emerged during the past five 
hundred years in a special manner. Therefore the supposed relatively 
recent origin of postmodernity it is not only misleading but also 
historically unsound. This is shown by going back to the pre-
Enlightenment roots of both “modernity” and “postmodernity” – and it 
is done by accounting for the emergence and historical sources of 
modern irrationalism, historicism and the so-called “linguistic turn”. 
Opsomming 
Hoe “postmodern” is die “postmodernisme”? 
Die oogmerk van hierdie artikel is die aanspraak dat die “post-
modernisme” bloot ’n ontwikkeling van die tweede helfte van die 20ste 
eeu is te bevraagteken. Die unieke van die kontemporêre post-
moderne gees is juis dáárin geleë dat dit verskillende denk-
ontwikkelinge wat gedurende die afgelope vyfhonderd jaar na vore 
getree het op ’n besondere wyse saamgesnoer het. Daarom is die 
veronderstelde relatief-resente ontstaan van die postmodernisme nie 
alleen misleidend nie, maar ook histories gesien onjuis. Dit word 
aangetoon deur terug te vra na die wortels van vóór die Verligting van 
sowel die modernisme as die postmodernisme terwyl tegelyk 
rekenskap gegee word van die ontwikkeling en historiese bronne van 
die moderne irrasionalisme, historisme en die sogenaamde. 
“taalwending”. 
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1. Introduction 
In 1992 Zigmunt Bauman published a book with the title Intimations 
of Postmodernity. The basic thrust of this book is similar to a vast 
number of publications coming from diverse areas. It sets out to 
inform the reader about the impasse of “modernity”/“modernism” in 
order to highlight the vantage point of “postmodernity”/“post-
modernism”.1 In spite of the growing popularity, in certain academic 
circles, of the conviction that we are living in a “postmodern world”, 
there are also other academics who are not so thoroughly 
impressed with the claims of originality put forward by “post-
modernists”. When a competent sociological analyst, such as John 
O’Neill, speaks about The Poverty of Postmodernism (1995), one 
may suspect that there is something wrong in the attempt to portray 
the culture in which we live exclusively as being “postmodern”. 
Jürgen Habermas, the well-known philosopher-sociologist from the 
Frankfurt-School, is quite explicit in his rejection of the idea that we 
have transcended “modernity” as a “form of life”: 
The concept of modernity no longer comes with a promise of 
happiness. But despite all the talk of postmodernity, there are no 
visible rational alternatives of this form of life. What else is left for 
us, then, but at least to search out practical improvements within 
this form of life? (Habermas, 1994:107). 
Already in 1981 Harbermas said that we have to learn from the 
mistakes of modernity without giving up its project: 
I think that instead of giving up modernity and its project as a lost 
cause, we should learn from the mistakes of those extravagant 
programs which have tried to negate modernity (Habermas, 1990: 
351). 
In order to characterise the postmodern condition, Richard Middle-
ton and Brian Walsh, alternatively, commence by using a number of 
characteristics to identify modernity. The general picture of 
modernity that they portray comprises features such as its “myth of 
progress,” its “realism” that seeks to “grasp the infinite, irreducible 
complexities of the world as a unified homogeneous totality” and the 
intellectual rhetoric of “scientific objectivity, nonbiased observation 
and universal maxims” (Middleton & Walsh, 1995:14 ff., 31-33, 34). 
It may be the case that what we call “modernity”, so they proceed 
with their argument, was an inherently unstable hybrid of realism 
                                           
1 Some authors avoid the identification of these two pairs of terms. 
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and autonomy, a transitional station between classical and medieval 
culture, with its submission to the given, and postmodernity, with its 
frank admission of human construction (Middleton & Walsh, 1995: 
41). 
Let us reflect for a moment on the following three elements of their 
analysis: the supposed realistic and holistic2 nature of modernity 
and the fact that the postmodernity allows for human construction. 
The supposed realistic nature of modernity 
Middleton and Walsh’s (mentioned) statement that modernity is 
characterised by its “realism”, however, is incorrect (Middleton & 
Walsh, 1995:31-33). Realism is said to be “central to the Cartesian 
ideal” (Middleton & Walsh, 1995:41). Yet, the traditional medieval 
realistic metaphysics still accepted universality outside the human 
mind (as ideas in the Divine Mind and as the universal substantial 
forms inherent within things). By contrast, the nominalistic position of 
Renés Descartes is clearly expressed where he says: “number and 
all universals are only modes of thought” (Descartes, 1965:187). 
This orientation also explains why Descartes cannot any longer 
accept the realistic criterion of truth – as an agreement between 
thought and being. His nominalistic alternative does not ac-
knowledge a contradiction between our “ideas” and “universal 
essences” outside the human mind: “contradiction [exists] ... in our 
ideas alone” (Descartes, 1976:25). 
The supposed holistic reality of modernity 
The basic orientation of modern philosophy (since Descartes) is 
atomistic (individualistic). Reality is understood in terms of its 
supposed simplest elements (atoms). This idea inspired the social 
contract theories to construct society out of its “atoms”, the 
individuals. It was only during early Romanticism that a holistic 
mode of thought started to dominate the scene – particularly 
elaborated by Schelling, Fichte and Hegel (the so-called freedom-
idealism). 
Postmodernity allows for human construction 
Although construction is assessed to be exclusively postmodern, 
later on (see Middleton & Walsh, 1995:48) it is said that con-
struction/reconstruction lies at the root of both the modernist and the 
postmodernist notion of the “self-constructed self”. Nonetheless, on 
                                           
2 “… the world as a unified homogeneous totality”. 
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page 56, it is once again claimed that the view that we live in a world 
of our “own construction” is implicitly postmodern. 
Unfortunately, Middleton and Walsh totally neglects the role of 
historicism and irrationalism as it emerged at the beginning of the 
19th century. In a different context, and with the positive aim to 
argue for the development of a distinctly Christian economics, 
Hoksbergen unfortunately also shows no historical awareness of the 
nature of the emergence of historicism and irrationalism at the 
beginning of the 19th century. His discussion of the main traditions 
and themes of postmodernism therefore does not realise that the 
features highlighted by him in principle had already been present at 
the beginning of the 19th century (cf. Hoksbergen, 1994:126-142, 
134). 
To be sure, the entire motif of logical creation actually dominated 
nominalistic humanism since the Renaissance. This motif played a 
dominant role in the thought of Thomas Hobbes and of Immanuel 
Kant3 – but both these thinkers are ignored by Middleton and 
Walsh.4 The after-effect of the supposed constructive abilities of 
human beings also surfaced during the 20th century in the idea of 
the “social construction of reality” – compare the views of Berger, 
Luckmann, Schutz and Husserl. As we shall argue below Kant 
elevated human understanding to become the formal law-giver of 
nature. The basic rationalism present in this view continued to 
inspire Husserl’s idea of construction. Existential phenomenology, 
on the other hand, transformed Husserl’s rationalism into an 
irrationalistic perspective.5 Consequently, the contemporary “post-
modern” idea that we create the world we live in (either through 
thought or through language) simply continues core elements of 
modern humanism. 
                                           
3 Thomas Hobbes is particularly known for his totalitarian view of the state as it is 
developed in an atomistic fashion in his book Leviathan (1651). Immanuel Kant, 
the giant of the 18th century, is best known for his influential Critique of Pure 
Reason (1781, 17872), Critique of Practical Reason (1788) and his Critique of 
Judgment (1790, 17932, 17993). 
4 Early modern humanism secularised the biblical motif of creation by elevating 
human reason to become the law-giver of creation. In paragraph 3.1 below we 
shall return in more detail to the “constructive” inclination of modern Humanism 
– culminating in Kant’s view of the categories of human understanding. 
5 One can define rationalism as an absolutisation of universality (or of: conceptual 
knowledge) and irrationalism as an absolutisation of individuality and con-
tingency (or of: concept-transcending knowledge). 
 D.F.M. Strauss 
Koers 69(2) 2004:259-276 263 
2. The supposed contrast between “modernity”/ 
“modernism” and “postmodernity”/“postmodernism”  
Bauman claims that “postmodernity” may be “interpreted as fully 
developed modernity” (Bauman, 1992:187) but at the same time he 
wants to maintain that “postmodernity” is a “self-reproducing, 
pragmatically self-sustainable and logically self-contained social 
condition defined by distinctive features of its own.” A theory of 
“postmodernity” is called “adequate” only if it operates with “its own 
vocabulary” and manages to emancipate itself from the “concepts 
and issues spawned by the discourse of modernity”. The “modern 
mentality” is reflected in the struggle for “universality, homogeneity, 
monotony and clarity” (Bauman, 1992:188). In order to understand 
the postmodern condition of society through a “separate sociological 
theory of postmodernity” it is required to “break decisively with the 
concepts and metaphors of the models of modernity” (Bauman, 
1992:188).  
Baumann (1992:189) is quite adamant that a theory of post-
modernity must discard first of all 
… the assumption of an ‘organismic’, equilibrated social totality it 
purports in Parsons-like style: the vision of a ‘principally co-
ordinated’ and enclosed totality (a) with a degree of cohesiveness, 
(b) equilibrated or marked by an overwhelming tendency to 
equilibrium, (c) unified by an internally coherent value syndrome 
and a core authority able to promote and enforce it and (d) defining 
its elements in terms of the function they perform in that process of 
equilibration or the reproduction of the equilibrated state. 
In contrast to this assumption the theory of postmodernity has to 
model a social condition that is “essentially and perpetually 
unequilibrated”. It is composed of elements “with a degree of 
autonomy” large enough to “justify the view of totality as a 
kaleidoscopic – momentary and contingent – outcome of interaction” 
(Bauman, 1992:189). Whenever order is found, it is only “local”, 
“emergent” and “transitory” – the metaphor of a whirlpool appearing 
in the flow of a river is appropriate capturing an “incessant 
metabolism and constant renewal of content” (Bauman, 1992:189). 
In the second place, according to Bauman (1992:189), the theory of 
postmodernity “must be free of the metaphor of progress that 
informed all competing theories of modern society”, the “postmodern 
condition is a site of constant mobility and change”. Furthermore, the 
category of society ought to be replaced by that of sociality: “a 
category that tries to convey the processual modality of social 
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reality, the dialectical play of randomness and pattern (or, from the 
agent’s point of view, of freedom and dependence)” (Bauman, 1992: 
192). 
In order to reverse the structure of the “cognitive field” Bauman also 
proposes a focus on agency, or, much rather, on the “habitat in 
which agency operates” (Bauman, 1992:192). It coheres with a 
process of self-constitution, which should, in order to underline the 
“graduated and ultimately inconclusive nature of the process”, be 
viewed as “self-assembly” (Bauman, 1992:192): 
I propose that sociality, habitat, self-constitution and self-assembly 
should occupy in the sociological theory of postmodernity the 
central place that the orthodoxy of modern social theory had 
reserved for the categories of society, normative group (like class 
or community), socialization and control (Bauman, 1992:189). 
Among the main tenets of the theory of postmodernity Bauman 
mentions that under the postmodern condition “habitat” is “a 
complex system”. Agencies are only partly dependent upon one 
another, but since the lines of dependence are not fixed “their 
actions (and consequences) remain staunchly under-determined, 
that is autonomous” (Bauman, 1992:192). 
The only “room” left for social collectivities is within the domain of 
imagination and symbolic construction: 
Tribal politics ... is a generic name for practices aimed at 
collectivization (supra-agentic confirmation) of the agents’ self-
constructing efforts. Tribal politics entail the creation of tribes as 
imagined communities. Unlike the premodern communities the 
modern powers set about uprooting, postmodern tribes exist in no 
other form but the symbolically manifested commitment of their 
members  (Bauman, 1992:198). 
3. Modernity versus postmodernity – historically seen a 
sound distinction? 
The image of “modernity” portrayed in this project of “postmodernity” 
suggests that the ideal of (contingent) autonomy, the acknowledge-
ment of perpetual change and the self-constitution of the symbolical 
constructs of agents are all recent “postmodern” phenomena. 
However, we want to argue that there are sound historical reasons 
to question this whole image. In addition to that certain immanent-
critical considerations as well as a reference to contemporary 
reflections on the issue of change may help us to gain a better 
understanding of certain inescapable elements of theory formation 
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which are not only still present in Bauman’s account but which are 
referring to unavoidable structural conditions for scholarship as 
such. 
The aim to surpass the limitations of the systems model does seem 
to be a goal pursued by some prominent sociologists of our day, 
although it is certainly not true that all of them want to follow this 
path. We only have to think about the impressive revival of Talcott 
Parson’s thought in the “neofunctionalism” of Jeffrey Alexander and 
his school during the last decades of the 20th century (see 
Alexander, 1985; 1987; 1988; 1990; 1990a; 1990b), as well as the 
vast contribution of Habermas to the whole debate of modernity (cf. 
Habermas, 1971; 1981; 1983; 1981:3-14; 1990 and 1994). 
Looking at the rise of the modern mind since the Renaissance, 
Kant’s three Critiques stand out as a sign-post of the attempt to 
reconquer the lost territory of the initial motif to be free in the modern 
(secularised) humanistic sense of autonomy (i.e., being obedient to 
a law prescribed by humankind to itself). This freedom-ideal, which 
has been jeopardised by the dominance of the natural science-ideal 
since Descartes, advocates a consistent emphasis on universality – 
something that, in turn, was to be challenged seriously by the 19th 
and 20th centuries. 
Since the contemporary emphasis on language and on the lingual  
(-symbolic) construction of social reality creates the impression that 
this is a unique feature characteristic of the recent emergence of the 
“postmodern” age6, we have to highlight one facet of modern 
nominalism dating back to the transition of the medieval to the 
modern era. 
3.1 The pre-Enlightenment origin of the motif of “logical 
creation” 
Emphasising the primacy of the will (in contrast to the choice of St. 
Thomas Aquinas for the primacy of the intellect), William of Ockham 
turns his back on medieval realism by only acknowledging the 
subjective existence of universals in the human mind (mente 
humana), encompassing both words (voces) and general concepts 
(conceptus). Since every universal, according to him, is a purely 
mental quality, no universals exist in reality outside the mind 
                                           
6 Perhaps covering the last 40 to 50 years, although some may go as far back as 
Nietzsche. 
How “postmodern” is “postmodernism”?  
266 Koers 69(2) 2004:259-276 
(Summa logicae I, 14). Universals are seen as substitutes, referring 
in a signifying way to the multiplicity of individual things. In reality 
only individual things exist. Science, however, is concerned with 
universals (as the subjective universal image of the real individual 
entities). In contrast to the realistic conception of truth as the 
agreement between thought and essence (adequatio intellectus et 
rei), nominalism shifted the criterion to the inner activity of the 
human mind – truth concerns the compatibility of concepts. 
Early modern humanistic philosophy explored this nominalistic 
attitude in many different ways. We only have to focus upon some 
crucial statements made by Thomas Hobbes, the British philosopher 
of early humanism, to realise how misplaced some of the claims of 
“postmodernity” are. The motif of logical creation indeed character-
ises the autonomy-ideal and the first manifestations of the modern 
humanistic natural science-ideal. Nominalism stripped factual reality 
both from God’s conditioning law-order and from its universal side – 
evinced in the orderliness of concretely existing entities.7 Since 
rationalism claims that universality is the only source of knowledge, 
it is clear that the motif of logical creation implicitly transforms 
subjective human understanding to become the law-giver of nature. 
Hobbes affirms the nominalistic conception of truth when he states 
that truth does not inhere in things, but that it is a feature of names 
and their comparison in statements.8 Add to this Hobbes’s 
conviction that demonstrative science is only possible with regard to 
those things which, in their generation, are dependent upon human 
                                           
7 Experimental natural science can only approach the God-given conditions for 
physical entities by investigating their orderliness – the universal side of entities 
at the factual side of reality. In Isaiah 28:26 ff. we learn that God gave human 
beings the knowledge to do things as they should be done; black cumin and 
cumin are removed with a stick; grain is ground for bread; and so on. Things 
should be handled in this or that way according to their God-given nature. 
Thanks to the orderliness of these things we find the path to an understanding of 
the order which God established for their existence. Through this, God teaches 
us how we should deal with his creatures – taking into consideration His will for 
their existence. 
8 Ernst Cassirer (1971:56) formulates this as follows: “Die Wahrheit haftet nicht an 
den Sachen, sondern an den Namen und an der Vergleichung der Namen, die 
wir im Satze vollziehen: veritas in dicto, non in re consistit” (cf. Hobbes, Th. De 
Corpore, Part I, Chapter 3, Par. 7 & 8). “Truth does not inhere in the things, but 
belongs to the names and their comparison, as it occurs in statements.” 
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discretion (arbitrio),9 then it becomes clear that already in this 
respect we are confronted by a conception of the creative power of 
human thought and language anticipating both Kant’s extreme 
position and even Richard Rorty’s more recent point of view (see 
Rorty, 1989:39 ff.). Since, according to Kant, the material of 
experience (sense impressions) is chaotic, the natural order is 
(formally) made possible through the categories as forms of thought. 
Thus seen, the concepts of understanding in Kant’s conception 
function as formal law-giver of nature. They are not derived from 
experience (a posteriori) but are (a priori) lying at the basis of 
experience: “Categories are concepts, which prescribe laws a priori 
to phenomena, and thus to nature as the totality of all phenomena 
(Kant, 1787:163). Although Kant restricted the humanistic science-
ideal to the domain of sensory “phenomena”, these words clearly 
highlight to what extent he still adheres to the deification of human 
understanding as the a priori formal law-giver of nature. 
One may remark that in terms of this conception Kant wants to 
account in a typically humanistic fashion for the capacity human 
beings have to formulate laws to which things in nature are 
subjected (cf. the remark of the physicist Carl Friedrich von 
Weizsäcker, 1972:128). In 1638 Galileo explores a thought experi-
ment by imagining a body being placed on a resistance-free 
horizontal plane, from which he concludes that the motion of such a 
body would be uniform and enduring if the plane is extended into 
infinity (cf. Galileo, 1973.) From this thought-experiment he deduced 
his law of inertia. Apparently from the spontaneous and purely 
subjective activity of human understanding Galileo thus deduced a 
fundamental determination of things in nature and then prescribed it 
to them. Holz sees in this thought-experiment a movement from the 
object to the subject – which materialised in Kant’s thought in the 
following conviction: “human understanding does not create its a 
priori laws out of nature, but prescribes them to nature” (cf. Kant, 
1783:79, and Holz, 1975:357-358). 
As already mentioned, we may even advance beyond Kant in our 
assessment of the importance of Hobbes’s nominalism by looking at 
a key-figure within the scene of “postmodernity,” Richard Rorty. 
Richard Bernstein defines the rationalistic tradition (designated by 
                                           
9
 “Earum tantum rerum scientia per demonstrationem illam a priore hominibus 
est, quaram generatio dependet ab ipsorum huminum arbitrio” (Hobbes, Th. De 
Homine, Chapter X, par. 4 – quoted by Cassirer, 1971:57). 
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him as “objectivism”) as “the basic conviction that there is or must be 
some permanent, a-historical matrix or framework to which we can 
ultimately appeal in determining the nature of rationality, knowledge, 
truth, reality, goodness, or rightness” (Bernstein, 1983:8). Mary 
Hesse sees scientific revolutions as “metaphoric rediscriptions” (cf. 
Rorty, 1989:50). In following her Rorty remarks: “This account of 
intellectual history chimes with Nietzsche’s definition of ‘truth’ as ‘a 
mobile army of metaphors’” (Rorty, 1989:17). Rorty (1989:16) views 
“intellectual history” as “history viewed as the history of metaphor”. 
“Old metaphors are constantly dying off into literalness, and then 
serving as a platform and foil for new metaphors.” 
3.2 The transition from universality to change and individuality 
The point he wants to make is that “every specific theoretic view 
comes to be seen as one more vocabulary, one more description, 
one more way of speaking” (Rorty, 1989:57). The germs of this view 
are fully present in the quoted conceptions of Hobbes.10 
Whereas roughly speaking, one can say that the 18th century is the 
period of extreme (conceptual) rationalism, the transition to the 19th 
century can be designated as an acute awareness of the historical 
dimension of reality. By the end of the 18th century this, first of all, 
was due to the pioneering work done by Johann Herder, a 
contemporary of Immanuel Kant. Korff calls Herder the German 
Rousseau and Cassirer praises Herder as the Copernicus of the 
(science of) history (Ernst Cassirer, 1957:226.). Proß sees in Herder 
the key figure who, in rejecting the Aufklärung (Enlightenment), 
prepared the rise of romantic historicism (see Cassirer, 1957:226 ff. 
and the introductory remarks of Proß as the Editor of Herder, 
1978).11 
Although early romanticism transposes the universal to the unique, it 
did not distance itself from the inherent atomism (indvidualism) of 
the 18th century. The step to holistic irrationalism was eventually 
given by Schelling, Fichte and Hegel – three prominent post-Kantian 
                                           
10 Rorty “metaphorises” diverse givens – such as language, conscience, morality, 
and hopes: “To see one’s language, one’s conscience, one’s morality, and one’s 
highest hopes as contingent products, as literalizations of what once were 
accidentally produced metaphors, is to adopt a self-identity which suits one for 
citizenship in such an ideally liberal state” (Rorty, 1989:61). 
11 A more detailed analysis of the successive epistemic ideals of the past three 
centuries is found in Strauss (1996). 
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philosophers in Germany during and after the rise of romanticism. 
We should observe that although Herder believes that society is 
subject to thorough historical change, he does not want to advocate 
an anchorless relativism. To curb this unwanted consequence, 
Herder upholds the ideal of humanity which guarantees, as 
universally binding rule, the unity and the meaning of history 
(Cassirer, 1957:228). 
Niebuhr, the tutor of Leopold von Ranke (perhaps best known for his 
statement that the science of history studies the past as it actually 
happened to be), demonstrates the transition from the 18th to the 
19th century in a remarkable way. From the romantic movement – 
including Goethe and Schiller (Germany), Bilderdijk and Da Costa 
(The Netherlands), and Shelley and Keats (Britain) – Niebuhr 
received his appreciation of mythical thought. Without relinquishing 
the imaginative exuberance present in myths and sages, Niebuhr 
wants to treasure the historical way of thought in its own right. 
With an obvious hint to Plato’s classical allegory of people living in a 
cave (The Republic), Niebuhr compares the historian with a person 
who’s eyes adapted so effectively to the dark that it is possible to 
observe things that would be invisible to the newcomer. Where Plato 
appraises these “shadow-images” negatively, Niebuhr assesses 
them positively – for on occasion he characterises the work of the 
historian as “work done under the earth” (cf. Cassirer, 1957:237). 
In opposition to Plato, who acknowledges only knowledge directed 
at the true (static) being of things as worthwhile, Niebuhr is 
convinced that only historical change provides genuine knowledge. 
This kind of knowledge is the most appropriate type of knowledge 
for humanity comprising the vital self-developing of human beings. 
3.3 Unresolved problems: the emergence of language as 
new horizon 
Over against the deification of universal (conceptual) knowledge 
during the 18th century, we are in this respect brought into contact 
with the importance of historical change. However, this irrationalist 
and historicist reaction against Enlightenment rationalism contains 
hidden problems that would become explicit only during and at the 
end of the 19th century. It is noteworthy to mention that this process 
was anticipated by the first critical reactions to Kant’s Critique of 
Pure Reason. It was in particular Jacobi, Hammann and Herder who 
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pointed out that Kant neglected the nature of language.12 Herder 
even calls “man” a “creation of language”.13 Also Fichte emphasises 
that language mediates the spirituality of reason and consciousness 
(Reiß, 1966:24). 
During the 19th century Wilhelm Dilthey embodied the flourishment 
of historicism and at the same time set into motion a reflection 
conducive to the occurrence of the so-called “linguistic turn”. He 
reacts intensely to the positivistic mode of thought with its emphasis 
on explanation. He wants to find a new criterion to distinguish 
between the natural sciences and the humanities. This follows from 
the fact that the mental world is stamped by the presence of values 
and aims requiring a new method to capture this teleological 
domain. In contrast to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason Dilthey 
develops a critique of Historical Reason. This critique entails the 
human capacity to understand itself as well as society and its 
history, constituted by humankind.14 Karl Mannheim, one of the 
prominent sociologists of the first half of the 20th century and the 
founder of the sociological subdiscipline known as sociology of 
knowledge, had a solid understanding of the romantic roots of 
Dilthey’s irrationalistic historicism: 
Dilthey is borne by, and may be the most important exponent of, 
that irrationalistic undercurrent which first became self-aware in 
Romanticism, and which, in the neo-Romanticism of the present, is 
on the way, in altered form, to effecting its attack on bourgeous 
rationalism (Mannheim, 1982:162). 
Only what can be experienced in the context of a historical, world-
encompassing coherence, could serve as the immediately certain 
basis of knowledge acquisition – and only by means of empathy one 
can attain a genuine understanding (Verstehen) of spiritual reality. 
The natural sciences know, the humanities understand (Dilthey, 
1927:86). Dilthey no longer supports the positivistic science ideal 
                                           
12 That Kant indeed distorted the meaning of history emerged also more clearly 
during the 19th century – beyond the rise of historicism as such. The discovery 
of non-Euclidean geometries (by Gauss and Lobatsjevski) relativised Kant’s 
table of categories by making it clear to what extent his analysis of 
understanding was historically dependent upon Newton’s Principia (1686). 
13 “Der Mensch ist ein freidenkendes, thätiges Wesen, dessen Kräfte in 
Progression fortwürken; darum sei er ein Geschöpf der Sprache!” (Herder, 
1978:73). 
14 Already during the 18th-century Vico claimed that humankind knows history 
better than nature since it was made by humankind. 
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seeking the typically human in some facet of nature. The historical 
aspect now occupies this vacancy: to be human means to be 
historically conditioned (Dilthey, 1927:275; cf. Diwald, 1963:38 note 
11). Harbermas furthermore mentions the implied linguistic 
framework present in Dilthey’s hermeneutics: 
We don’t understand a symbolic expression without an intuitive 
prior-understanding (Vorverständnis) of its context, because we 
are not capable of freely transforming the presence of an 
unquestioned background knowledge of our culture into an explicit 
awareness.15 
3.4 The “unifying intellectual force” of nominalism 
These transitions are rooted in the undercurrent of nominalism 
operative in modern humanism since the Renaissance. Nominalism 
(cf. Strauss, 1993:104-127) has an ambiguous nature, since it is 
both rationalistic and irrationalistic. We have mentioned that 
rationalism entails the absolutisation of knowledge in terms of 
universal features, i.e., it deifies conceptual knowledge, whereas 
irrationalism, on the other hand, focuses upon whatever is unique, 
individual, unrepeatable and contingent, thus restricting knowledge 
to the approximating understanding of concepts stretched beyond 
the limits of their natural application (concept-transcending 
knowledge) – i.e., to idea-knowledge.16 
The perplexing fact is that nominalism comprises both these 
elements: In respect of the typical structure of entities, nominalism 
does not accept any conditioning order (universal structures) for, or 
any orderliness (universal structuredness of) such entities. Every 
entity is strictly individual. In terms of our distinction between 
rationalism and irrationalism, nominalism surely represents an 
irrationalistic view of the nature of entities, since every individual 
entity is completely stripped of its universal orderliness (law-
                                           
15 “Einen symbolischen Ausdruck verstehen wir nicht ohne das intuitive 
Vorverständnis seines Kontextes, weil wir das fraglos präsente Hintergrund-
wissen unserer Kultur nicht freihändig in explizites Wissen verwandeln können” 
(Habermas, 1983:17). 
16 Immanual Kant introduced the German term Grenzbegriff to designate that 
thought-form employed to think the unknowable. A strict translation of this term 
Grenzbegriff is boundary concept, limit concept or even limiting concept. 
However, contrary to the intention of the term Grenzbegriff the connotation of 
the term limit suggests something enclosed within instead of highlighting the 
intended meaning of pointing beyond the limits of concept-formation. For that 
reason it may be better to employ the phrase: concept-transcending knowledge. 
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conformity) and conditioning order. This characteristic applies to 
both moderate nominalism, viz. conceptualism (Locke, Ockham, 
Leibniz and others), and to extreme nominalism, that rejects all 
general and abstract ideas and only accepts general names 
(Berkeley and Brentano). 
This irrationalistic side of nominalism, however, does not exhaust its 
multifaceted nature, because universals are acknowledged fully 
within the human mind, at least as general words in the case of 
Berkeley’s and Brentano’s extreme nominalism. This restriction of 
knowledge to universals is typical of rationalism in the sense defined 
by us. Therefore, it is possible to see nominalism as being 
simultaneously rationalistic in terms of the universals – concepts and 
words – in one’s mind, and irrationalistic in terms of the strict 
individuality of entities outside one’s mind. Just compare the way in 
which Habermas captures the stance taken by Rickert in this regard: 
“Rickert presupposes – and here he is covertly in accordance with 
Lebensphilosophie – the irrationality of a reality that is integrally 
present only in nonlinguistic experience” (Habermas, 1988:4). 
The inability of conceptual knowledge to grasp what is unique and 
individual caused philosophers to look at the senses (cf. the 
development of positivism and neo-positivism) and at language to 
bridge the gap. It seems as if language can indeed mediate between 
universality and individuality in a way which transcends the 
limitations of concept formation. Already Mannheim had a clear 
understanding of these issues for he clearly grasped something of 
the twofold nature of nominalism:  
Nominalism proceeds from the unjustifiable assumption that only 
the individual subject exists and that meaningful contextures and 
formations have being only to the extent that individual subjects 
think them or are somehow oriented toward them in a conscious 
manner (Mannheim, 1982:196-197, cf. also p. 224).  
As a consequence, we can speak about a general (and currently 
widely acknowledged) shift from concept to meaning, from thought 
to language. Habermas (1995:115) in an interview is equally explicit 
about this shift: 
Question: Doesn’t the traditional philosophy of consciousness 
have it much easier, in that it can still rely on the convincing power 
of the postulate of the ethics of responsibility? 
Answer: The philosophy of consciousness from Descartes 
through Kant up to Husserl took its point of departure [in] the 
fundamental question of epistemology and set to work on the 
question of subjectivity, that is, the relation of the representing 
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subject to its own presentations of objects. This philosophy forms a 
fruitful tradition, one to which we are all still related. Where would 
any of us be without our Kant? The great critics of the philosophy 
of consciousness, Heidegger on the one side, Wittgenstein on the 
other, have now led the way to a linguistic and pragmatic turn that 
today flips over, so to speak, and in the form of contextualistic 
views lead to a second historicism. In general, a world-creating 
subject – even a subject that internally reproduces its external 
environment – is no longer the point of departure for the 
philosophy of language. Therefore, this philosophy has to ask itself 
whether this new paradigm of reaching understanding between 
communicatively socialized subjects who always already find 
themselves in linguistically developed and inter-subjectively shared 
life-worlds – whether this paradigm has even re-attained the old 
problem level (Habermas, 1994:115). 
Habermas does not want to acknowledge the lingual dimension of 
reality at the cost of the demands for logicality (rationality). Against 
the background of the considerations treated above we may now 
attempt to answer the question whether we really have to see 
postmodernity merely as a recent phenomenon? 
4. The “old face” of “postmodernity”: concluding 
remarks 
It should now be clear that “postmodernity” and its supposed “new” 
features are actually “old” humanistic ones. The key historicist 
claims of postmodernity derive from post-Kantian Romanticism and 
its lingual emphasis was anticipated by nominalism since its very 
inception (cf. Ockham and Hobbes), and was also suggested by 
Jacobi, Hamman and Herder even before the end of the 18th 
century. The key-figure in the genesis of the linguistic turn, in so far 
as we may see it as an attempt to overcome the limitations of 
concept-formation with respect to what is unique, contingent and 
individual, Wilhelm Dilthey, actually lived the greater part of his life in 
the 19th century. To be sure, what is called postmodernity merely 
constitutes a new power concentration of the irrationalistic side of 
nominalism. This basic orientation even pre-dates modernity – in the 
sense of the 18th-century Enlightenment. 
Yet, acknowledging these historical roots should not mislead us to 
underestimate the vastly permeating (and uprooting) effects of 
contemporary postmodernism. Although the features united in it are 
not new, their current hegemony surely is new. The claim that in a 
fragmented and ever-changing world every person is entitled to his 
or her own “story” – while negating any and all grand meta-
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narratives (Leotard) – has the pretension of being just one among 
many other “stories.” Yet, without realising it, this new orientation, 
over-emphasises historicity and linguisticality at the cost of other 
dimensions of creation co-conditioning human existence equally. In 
fact, this postmodern claim operates as an alternative grand meta-
narrative, that is the one that holds that everyone only has his or her 
partial story without any “universal” claim to truth. 
From the fact that this statement itself rests upon a universal claim – 
“enabling” it to apply to “everyone” – its inherent self-uprooting 
nature is made manifest in its very formulation. Without an inherent 
constancy and universality even the exclusively elevated conditions 
of historicity and linguisticality loose their meaning. 
The enemy of scholarship and culture is not universality and 
constancy, but the internally antinomic attempt to assert historical 
change and lingual ambiguity at the cost of constancy and 
universality. It is only when we take serious the liberating biblical 
perspective that creation cannot be explained merely in terms of 
some or other aspect of it that in principle we can escape from the 
one-sidedness of orientations such as rationalism, irrationalism, 
historicism and “linguism” – all of them combined and fused in the 
contemporary fad of postmodernism. 
The over-estimation of rationality in the legacy of the West cannot 
be divorced from the all-pervasive nominalistic conviction that reality 
itself supposedly has a “rational” structure. Since nominalism denies 
both the God-given order for (law for) the existence of creatures and 
the universality of creaturely responses to those laws (evinced in 
their lawfulness or orderliness), it is quite “understandable” why 
modern secular humanism “loaded” the human subject with the 
additional “responsibility” of becoming the law-giver/constructive 
agent of its own world. 
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